Memorandum Regarding UCC\u27s Motion to Sue Parishes by ,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
In re: 
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF NORTHERN
ALASKA, an Alaska religious
corporation sole,
Debtor.




MOTION TO PURSUE LITIGATION AND DEBTOR’S MOTION TO STRIKE
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (“UCC”) has filed a motion
for authority to pursue avoidance actions, to commence an action against the Holy See and
to file a third-party complaint against the Holy See for equitable apportionment of certain
pending state court abuse litigation.  The debtor, Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska
(“CBNA”), and the Catholic Church Communities of Northern Alaska oppose the motion. 
CBNA has also filed a motion to strike certain pleadings of the UCC.  The UCC’s motion
to pursue litigation will be granted, in part, and denied, in part.  CBNA’s motion to strike will
be denied. 
Discussion
CBNA has been in chapter 11 since March 1, 2008.  It filed for chapter 11
relief due to the assertion of numerous state court claims for sexual abuse arising against
priests and other individuals working for CBNA.  The parties have attempted mediation on
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several occasions, without success.  CBNA is seeking to confirm a plan of reorganization and
has filed a plan and disclosure statement.  The adequacy of its disclosure statement has been
addressed in a separate memorandum entered concurrently with this one.
The issues underlying the UCC’s motion are substantial.  First, can the court
grant the UCC derivative standing to assert the debtor’s avoidance actions and possible
claims against the Holy See, or is there a blanket prohibition against such standing in the
Ninth Circuit, absent the consent of CBNA?  Second, if this court can grant the UCC
derivative standing, under what circumstances should it be permitted?   An examination of
the appellate decisions in this circuit indicates that there is no clearly articulated Ninth
Circuit standard for either of these issues.
A) Can the Bankruptcy Court Grant the UCC Derivative Standing?
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) has recognized that,
in certain circumstances, a creditor or a creditors’ committee may be authorized by the court
to prosecute an action belonging to the bankruptcy estate.  In 1986, the BAP examined the
issue of derivative standing in Hansen v. Finn (In re Curry and Sorensen, Inc.).1  In Curry,
three creditors filed a complaint seeking to avoid the debtor’s issuance of stock to its
president as a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 548.  The complaint named the debtor
and its president as defendants.  The debtor moved to dismiss the complaint, contending the
1 57 B.R. 824 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986).
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creditors lacked standing to bring the suit.  The bankruptcy court granted the motion and the
creditors appealed.  The BAP noted that individual creditors generally could not initiate
avoidance actions independent of the trustee or debtor in possession.2  If a chapter 11 debtor
in possession fails to act, however, the BAP indicated that creditors could petition the court
to gain permission to institute the action themselves.3
Thus, if an aggrieved creditor believes that
the debtor-in-possession has failed to fulfill its
duty to prosecute actions, then the creditor must
bring this to the attention of the court by an
appropriate motion . . . . This judicial intervention
is crucial, for resolution of the conflict between
the creditor and the debtor-in-possession requires
a balancing of the competing interests to
determine whether or not the debtor-in-
possession’s failure to bring the action is
unjustifiable and therefore constitutes an abuse of
discretion.4
Because the appellants in Curry had failed to obtain court approval before filing suit, the
BAP found they had no standing to bring an action under § 548 and the bankruptcy court’s
dismissal as to this count of the creditors’ complaint was upheld.  Although the debtor was
the party moving for dismissal, the lack of debtor consent did not factor into the BAP’s
decision.     
2 Id. at 827.
3 Id. at 828.
4 Id. (citations omitted).
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The issue of derivative standing was again addressed by the BAP in Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company, Inc. v. Official Unsecured Creditor’s Committee (In re
Spaulding Composites Co.).5  Spaulding, facing substantial liability for environmental
remediation costs, filed a chapter 11 petition in 1993.  Its insurer, Liberty Mutual, filed a
post-petition declaratory judgment action in state court to determine its liability for the
environmental clean up claims under various policies it had issued.  Spaulding was not a
named defendant in this action, but several of the policies at issue named Spaulding as an
additional insured or the sole insured.  The unsecured creditor’s committee in Spaulding’s
chapter 11 case filed an adversary proceeding against Liberty Mutual for violation of the
automatic stay.  Spaulding thereafter entered a stipulation authorizing the committee to
prosecute the adversary proceeding.  Liberty Mutual moved to dismiss on the grounds that
the committee lacked standing to bring the suit.  The bankruptcy court denied Liberty’s
motion and granted partial summary judgment to the committee, finding that Liberty had
violated the stay by commencing the state court action.  Liberty appealed to the BAP.
The BAP noted that the facts were “somewhat unusual” in Spaulding, because
typically “the setting for derivative litigation . . . involves a debtor-in-possession (“DIP”)
who is hostile to the proposed litigation.”6 While it found that a DIP could stipulate to
representation by an unsecured creditors’ committee, this was not the determinative factor
in its standing analysis.  Rather, the BAP considered whether a court could retroactively
5 207 B.R. 899 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997).
6 Id. at 904.
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approve  a committee’s prosecution of litigation.  It noted that “the better practice” would
be for the plaintiff to secure approval before filing the complaint, but would not “foreclose
the ability of a court to make its approval of the representation retroactive to the date of
filing.”7  The BAP endorsed the concept of derivative standing, noting it was “well settled
that in appropriate situations the bankruptcy court may allow a party other than the trustee
or debtor-in-possession to pursue the estate’s litigation.”8  It further commented:
Liberty’s . . . proposed rule – a flat prohibition
against any surrogate representation – not only
conflicts with accepted practice, it also fails to
recognize the potential benefits of allowing an
unsecured creditors’ committee to conduct estate
litigation.  The DIP has an obligation to pursue all
actions that are in the best interests of creditors
and the estate.  An unsecured creditors’
committee has a close identity of interests with
the DIP in this regard . . . .  Rather than a flat
prohibition, impartial judicial balancing of the
benefits of a committee’s representation better
serves the bankruptcy estate.  So long as the
bankruptcy court exercises its judicial oversight
and verifies that the litigation is indeed necessary
and beneficial, allowing a creditor’s committee to
represent the estate presents no undue concerns.9
Although the court found in favor of the committee on the standing issue, it ruled against it
on the merits of the stay litigation.
7 Id. at 905.
8 Spaulding, 207 B.R. at 903.
9 Id. at 904 (citations omitted).
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The Ninth Circuit touched on the issue of derivative standing in Official
Unsecured Creditors Committee v. U.S. National Bank of Oregon (In re Suffola, Inc.).10  In
that case, an unsecured creditors’ committee asserted a preference claim against U.S.
National Bank of Oregon.  The court upheld a bankruptcy court decision that found in favor
of the committee.  Committee standing was not an issue in the case.  The Ninth Circuit did
comment, however, that, “[a]lthough the Bankruptcy Code contains no explicit authorization
for the initiation of an adversary proceeding by a creditors’ committee, a qualified implied
authorization exists under 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(5).”11  Section 1103(c)(5) authorizes a
creditor’s committee in a chapter 11 case to “perform such other services as are in the interest
of those represented.”12   
10 2 F.3rd 977 (9th Cir. 1993).
11 Id. at 979 n.1.  In this footnote, the Ninth Circuit cited In re First Capital Holdings Corp., 146 B.R.
7, 11 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992).  In that case, the bankruptcy court framed the issue before it as “whether and
under what circumstances a creditors’ committee may prosecute claims on behalf of a chapter 11 debtor
without first making a formal demand upon the debtor to prosecute the claims.”  First Capital, 146 B.R. at
9 (emphasis added).  The First Capital court recognized without discussion that a court could authorize a
creditors’ committee, “in appropriate circumstances,” to bring an action which would typically be filed by
a chapter 11 debtor.  Id. at 10.  
12 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(5).  Subsection (5) follows a list of four explicit powers given to a creditors’
committee, which include the ability to “(1) consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the
administration of the case; (2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the
debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and
any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan; (3) participate in the formulation of a
plan, advise those represented by such committee of such committee’s determinations as to any plan
formulated, and collect and file with the court acceptances or rejections of a plan; (4) request the appointment
of a trustee or examiner under section 1104 of this title.”  11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1)-(4).
6
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The Ninth Circuit discussed derivative standing in more detail in Avalanche
Martime, Ltd. v. Parekh (In re Parmetex, Inc.).13  In Parmetex, two unsecured creditors in
a chapter 7 case filed an adversary complaint to avoid preferential and fraudulent transfers. 
After the complaint was filed, the chapter 7 trustee entered a stipulation authorizing the
creditors to pursue the litigation on his behalf.  The bankruptcy court approved the
stipulation.  The defendants argued that the creditors lacked standing to bring the suit and
that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations.  The Ninth Circuit found that, under the
circumstances – “where the trustee stipulated that the Creditors could sue on his behalf and
the bankruptcy court approved that stipulation” –  the creditors had standing to prosecute the
action.14  The court cited a number of cases in support of this finding, including the BAP’s
prior decision in Curry.15  While the creditors prevailed on the issue of standing, they
ultimately lost the appeal on statute of limitation grounds.
The Spaulding and Parmetex cases involved situations where the trustee or
debtor in possession consented to the prosecution of an estate cause of action by a creditor
or creditors’ committee.  CBNA argues that without such consent, derivative standing cannot
be granted by the bankruptcy court.  It relies on two additional Ninth Circuit cases.  The first
is Estate of Spirtos v. One San Bernardino County Superior Court Case.16  In that case,
13 199 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 1999).
14 Id. at 1031.
15 Id.
16 443 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006).
7
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Thelma Spirtos brought a RICO action in federal district court against virtually everyone
involved in the administration of her former, deceased spouse’s bankruptcy and probate
estates.  She alleged they had conspired to conceal assets and obstruct payment to creditors
of the two estates.  The defendants moved to dismiss.  The district court granted the motion. 
It found that the RICO causes of action arising out of the administration of the bankruptcy
estate belonged to the bankruptcy estate and only the bankruptcy trustee had the right to
bring them.17  Thelma appealed.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding as
to the RICO claims derived from the bankruptcy estate.  It recognized that “under some
circumstances, the trustee may authorize others to bring suit,” but the right to bring suit
“belongs to the trustee in the first instance.”18  The Ninth Circuit held that “the bankruptcy
code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate,”19
but also noted that this holding did not undermine its ruling in Parmetex.20 
CBNA also cites an unpublished Ninth Circuit decision, Carramerica Realty
Corporation v. Nvidia Corporation,21 to support its position.  In that case, 3dfx Interactive,
Inc., filed chapter 11 and a chapter 11 trustee was appointed.  The trustee sued Nividia
seeking avoidance of a fraudulent transfer and recovery under a successor liability theory. 
17 Id. at 1174.
18 Id. at 1175, citing Parmetex, 199 F.3d at 1031.
19 Spirtos, 443 F.3d at 1176.
20 Id., n.3.
21 302 Fed. Appx. 514, 2008 WL 5110821 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Carramerica and other creditors of the bankruptcy estate also filed suit against Nvidia on
similar grounds.  The lower court found that the creditors lacked standing to bring the suit
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  Citing Spirtos, it stated that “[t]he trustee’s standing to sue
on behalf of the estate is exclusive; a debtor’s creditors cannot prosecute such claims
belonging to the estate unless the trustee first abandons such claims.”22
Notwithstanding the Spirtos and Carramerica cases, I conclude that the
appellate case law in the Ninth Circuit authorizes a bankruptcy court to grant derivative
standing to a creditor’s committee to pursue estate causes of action under certain
circumstances, even absent the consent of the debtor.  The BAP reached this conclusion in
the Curry case.  The creditors in Curry were denied derivative standing because they had not
sought court approval before initiating suit.  The debtor’s lack of consent was not a factor
which the BAP considered.  And the BAP commented in Spaulding that the facts of the case
were “somewhat unusual” because the chapter 11 debtor had consented to the litigation filed
by the creditors’ committee.  In both cases, the BAP held that derivative standing required
judicial review to determine whether the proposed litigation was “necessary and beneficial”23
or the failure of the debtor-in-possession to act was “unjustifiable.”24  
Derivative standing was upheld by the Ninth Circuit in Parmetex because the
trustee had stipulated to the creditor’s action and the bankruptcy court had approved the
22 Id. at 516.
23 Spaulding, 207 B.R. at 904.
24 Curry, 57 B.R. at 828.
9
Case 08-00110    Doc 529    Filed 09/11/09    Entered 09/11/09 16:20:37    Desc Main
 Document      Page 9 of 18
stipulation.25  The Ninth Circuit cited Curry with approval in Parmetex.26  It also cited
another BAP decision, In re Enserv Co., Inc., which it had affirmed, and which reiterated the
Curry standard as well.27  The Ninth Circuit also gave a nod to derivative standing in
Suffola.28
While the Ninth Circuit’s Spirtos and Carramerica decisions seem
problematic, I don’t feel that they are inconsistent with, or have overruled, Parmetex.  First, 
Carramerica is an unpublished decision which is not binding precedent on this court.29 
Further, Carramerica cites Spirtos but fails to include the Parmetex exception specifically
noted therein.  It also makes no mention of the two published BAP opinions, Curry and
Spaulding, which discuss derivative standing.  And the facts are clearly distinguishable
because the creditors in Carramerica were seeking to pursue the same causes of action that 
the chapter 11 trustee was already pursuing.  Finally, the decision fails to address three code
25 Parmetex, 199 F.3d at 1031.
26 Id. 
27 Id., citing Enserv Co., Inc. v. Manpower, Inc. (In re Enserv Co., Inc.), 64 B.R. 519, 522 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1987), aff’d by mem., 813 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1987). 
28 Suffola, 2 F.3d at 979 n.1.
29 Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(a).  I note in passing that there are other unpublished Ninth Circuit cases
which have recognized that a creditor may pursue litigation on behalf of an estate, if court approval is first
obtained, even absent the trustee’s consent.  Jones v. Schlosberg (In re Jones), 178 Fed.Appx. 662, 664 (9th
Cir. 2006); Stewart v. Rosenblum, Parish & Isaacs (In re Cho), 9 Fed.Appx. 633, 635-36 (9th Cir. 2001). 
10
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sections unique to Chapter 11, §§ 1103(c)(5), 1107(a) and 1109(b), as well as a provision
common to both Chapters 7 and 11, § 503(b)(3).30  Carramerica is not persuasive.
Spirtos is a published decision which is binding precedent on this court. 
However, the Ninth Circuit in Spirtos recognized that there are situations where creditors can
act on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, and expressly noted that its decision did not
undermine Parmetex.  And, in a more recent Ninth Circuit decision, the court noted: 
 A creditor can demand that the debtor in
possession bring an action on its behalf.  If the
debtor in possession refuses, the creditor may
“appear and be heard” on the issue in the
bankruptcy proceeding.  After such a hearing, the
court must allow the creditors’ committee to sue
independent of the debtor in possession if the
failure to bring suit does not adequately protect
the creditor’s interests or the chose in action is of
inconsequential value to the estate.31
I conclude that a bankruptcy court may grant a creditors’ committee derivative
standing to pursue estate litigation, even absent consent of the debtor in possession.  The next
issue to consider is under what circumstances such standing should be granted.
B) Standard for Granting Derivative Standing
30 As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit mentioned § 1103(c)(5) as a basis for “qualified implied
authorization” for derivative standing of a creditors’ committee.  Suffola, 2 F.3d at 979 n.1.  Section 1107(a)
lists the general rights, powers and duties of a debtor in possession subject to “such limitations or conditions
as the court prescribes.”  11 U.S.C. § 1107(a).  Section 1109(b) permits any party in interest, including a
creditors’ committee, to raise and be heard on any issue in a chapter 11 case, while § 503(b)(3) authorizes
the reimbursement of expenses to a creditor who recovers, after court approval and for the benefit of the
estate, any property transferred or concealed by the debtor.
31 Biltmore Assoc., LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 572 F.3d 663, 674 n.41 (9th Cir. 2009).
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The Ninth Circuit hasn’t adopted a definitive standard for evaluating when a
creditors’ committee should be granted derivative standing.  As noted above, the two BAP
decisions in this area have indicated that the court should consider whether the proposed
litigation is “necessary and beneficial”32 or the failure of the debtor in possession to act is
“unjustifiable”33 when making this determination.  The Ninth Circuit has indicated that
derivative standing is appropriate where the debtor in possession’s failure to bring a suit
“does not adequately protect the creditor’s interests or the chose in action is of
inconsequential value to the estate.”34  Other circuits have been more specific in this regard.
The Fifth Circuit has stated that bankruptcy courts generally require “that the claim be
colorable, that the debtor-in-possession [has] refused unjustifiably to pursue the claim, and
that the committee first receive leave to sue from the bankruptcy court.”35  These criteria have
been endorsed by other courts and by Collier.36     
The Sixth Circuit has adopted a somewhat different test to determine whether
derivative standing should be granted:  
[A] creditor or creditors’ committee may have
derivative standing to initiate an avoidance action
32 Spaulding, 207 B.R. at 904.
33 Curry, 57 B.R. at 828.
34 Biltmore, 572 F.3d at 674 n.41.
35 Louisiana World Expo. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233, 247 (5th Cir. 1988); Louisiana World Expo.,
Inc., v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re Louisiana World Expo., Inc.) 832 F.2d 1391, 1397 (5th Cir. 1987).
36 See 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1103.05[6][a] at 1103-36 - 1103-37 (15th ed. revised 2009), and
cases cited therein.
12
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where: 1) a demand has been made upon the
statutorily authorized party to take action; 2) the
demand is declined; 3) a colorable claim that
would benefit the estate if successful exists, based
upon a cost-benefit analysis performed by the
court, and 4) the inaction is an abuse of discretion
(“unjustified”) in light of the debtor-in-
possession’s duties in a Chapter 11 case.37 
The Second Circuit has also indicated that the court should conduct a cost-benefit analysis
when determining whether derivative standing should be allowed.38  
CBNA contends the UCC’s motion should be denied because it has not
provided a cost-benefit analysis with regard to the claims it seeks to pursue.  CBNA says this
analysis is essential, particularly in light of the fact that millions of dollars have been spent
on professional fees for prosecuting similar claims in other church reorganization cases,
without resolution of the ultimate issues involved.  I agree that an analysis of this type is
appropriate and find that it is inferred in the criteria mentioned by other courts.  A
consideration of whether the proposed litigation is “necessary and beneficial” to the estate,
as stated in Spaulding, or whether the debtor in possession’s failure to act is “unjustified,”
as stated in Curry and included in the Fifth Circuit’s test for derivative standing, would
require such a cost-benefit analysis.  Clearly, a ground for justifiably refusing to pursue a
claim exists where the projected cost of pursuing the litigation would exceed the value of the
claim.  Nor would litigation in such a circumstance be beneficial to the estate.  
37 Canadian Pac. Forest Prod. Ltd. v. J.D. Irving, Ltd. (In re The Gibson Group, Inc.), 66 F.3d 1436,
1446 (6th Cir. 1995).
38 Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Noyes (In re STN Enterprises), 779 F.2d 901, 905 (2d Cir. 1985).
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The UCC has provided neither an estimate of the costs of pursuing the various
claims it seeks to assert or an analysis of the ultimate reward the estate would receive if it
were successful.  It points out that bankruptcy courts in Portland and San Diego have granted
creditors’ committees in other diocese bankruptcy cases derivative standing to pursue claims
similar to the ones it wishes to assert here.  But this is not a basis for granting the instant
motion.  Unlike those more “civilized” locations, many of the real property assets at issue
here are remote Bush properties, inaccessible by road.  One third of the parish properties
have no running water.39  The value of any personal property located in these remote parishes
would also be diminished by the fact of its remoteness.40  Given these considerations, the
court is not convinced that “tens of millions of dollars worth” of real and personal property
is at issue here, at least with regard to the Bush parish property.41    
The UCC has provided no estimate as to the costs for recovery of the disputed
real property.  It is impossible for the court to make a cost-benefit analysis under such
circumstances.  The  UCC also asserts that funds were fraudulently transferred from CBNA
to the Endowments.  I have no information regarding the amount of funds in question or the
projected cost for recovering such funds.  Again, a cost-benefit analysis cannot be made
without this information.  
39 CBNA’s Objection to UCC’s Motion, filed Mar. 2, 2009 (Docket No. 403), Ex. 5-A (Testimony
of Bishop Kettler). 
40 This observation is based on this court’s past experience in other bankruptcy cases involving
construction equipment or other such assets located in remote locations.  The expense of transporting the asset
to a better market for liquidation often makes a sale of the asset prohibitive. 
41 See UCC’s Redacted Motion, filed May 11, 2009 (Docket No. 440), at p. 4.
14
Case 08-00110    Doc 529    Filed 09/11/09    Entered 09/11/09 16:20:37    Desc Main
 Document      Page 14 of 18
The UCC seeks to recover the transfer of funds from CBNA to the parishes 
under fraudulent transfer theories, but has supplied no information regarding the amount of
funds transferred or the cost of recovering those funds.  The vast majority of the parishes are
not self supporting and receive funds from CBNA simply to continue operations.  Even if the
UCC were to get a judgment against the Bush parishes, how could it possibly be paid?
The UCC’s proposed claims against the Holy See face hurdles as well.  These
claims are based on a document titled Crimen Sollicitationis which was in effect from 1962
through at least 2001.  Through this document, archbishops, bishops and clergy were
instructed to maintain absolute secrecy regarding accusations of sexual abuse of minors.  The
UCC alleges that maintenance of this policy was a contributing cause to the sexual abuse of
children in the Diocese of Fairbanks.  Furthermore, the UCC contends Holy See breached
its duties to the Diocese through implementation of this document.  The UCC demands to
pursue these claims on the debtor’s behalf but, as before, it has failed to submit any evidence
which would allow this court to conclude that the benefit of pursuing these claims outweigh
the costs of litigation.  I cannot estimate the costs of pursuing such lengthy and complex
litigation.  Further, given the unsettled nature of the law in this area, any projection as to the
success of such litigation is speculative.42  
The UCC also seeks to assert an avoidance action against the Catholic Trust
of North America (CTNA).  In the fall of 2007, while CBNA was facing multiple state court
claims alleging sexual abuse by its employees and agents, it created CTNA and transferred
42 In this regard, I note that petitions for certiorari have been filed in both of the circuit court cases
cited by the parties.  O’Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2009), petition for certiorari filed, 77
USLW 3645 (May 7, 2009); Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2009), petition for certiorari filed, 78
USLW 3049 (Jun. 25, 2009). 
15
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$3 million from a pooled investment account to this newly created entity.  The funds
transferred from the account to CTNA included commingled funds from the parishes and
schools in the Diocese.  CBNA alleges that it was simply following the advice of courts in
other church sexual abuse cases by establishing the trust.  Given the circumstances
surrounding the creation of CTNA, however, I feel the UCC has asserted colorable
fraudulent transfer claims as to the $3 million transfer.  A cost-benefit analysis of pursuing
these proposed claims is fairly straightforward.  Assuming CTNA has not spent the funds,
the UCC could obtain a judgment against a viable entity.  While the UCC has not submitted
evidence regarding the costs of litigation, I cannot foresee such costs exceeding one-third of
the transferred amount.  In my view, the estate could receive a net benefit of as much as $2
million or more if the UCC succeeds on its proposed claims against CTNA.  The debtor takes
the position that CTNA is a separate entity whose assets are not part of its bankruptcy estate. 
It will not pursue these claims against CTNA.43  Given the amount of money at stake, and the
circumstances under which CTNA was created, I feel that refusal to investigate these claims
is unjustified.  
For the foregoing reasons, the UCC will be authorized to pursue its proposed
avoidance actions against CTNA arising under 11 U.S.C. §§ 548 and 544, on behalf of the
bankruptcy estate.  Only this portion of the UCC’s motion will be granted.  Although the
balance of the UCC’s motion will be denied, the UCC has correctly observed that several of
the property issues it has raised can be litigated in an appropriate adversary proceeding
without the need for obtaining prior court approval or the assertion of avoidance claims.
43 As far as I can tell from some terse language in CBNA’s opposition, it does not claim that allowing
the UCC derivative standing to pursue a CTNA fraudulent transfer suit for $3 million would violate the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  
16
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CBNA concedes this point.   My decision here does not impact the ability of the UCC to
proceed with such litigation. 
C) CBNA’s Motion to Strike the UCC’s Replies
The debtor filed a motion to strike replies which the UCC filed in support of
its motion, alleging untimely filings by the UCC.  The replies were filed on May 4, 2009. 
They were late under the standards of AK LBR 9013-1.  However, the hearing on the UCC’s
underlying motion did not occur until June 18, 2009, well after the replies were submitted. 
Longstanding judicial policy provides that matters should be resolved on their merits, rather
than by default, if possible.44  The debtor has suffered no prejudice on account of the UCC’s
delay in filing its replies.  CBNA’s motion to strike will be denied.
Conclusion  
The UCC’s motion to pursue claims will be denied, except as to the fraudulent
transfer claims it seeks to assert against CTNA.  CBNA’s motion to strike will be denied. 
Orders will be entered consistent with this memorandum.
/  /  /  /
/  /  /  /
44 Civic Center Square, Inc. v. Ford (In re Roxford Foods, Inc.), 12 F.3d 875, 879 (9th Cir. 1993).
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DATED: September 11, 2009
BY THE COURT
 /s/ Donald MacDonald IV  
DONALD MacDONALD IV
United States Bankruptcy Judge















U. S. Trustee  
9/11/09
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